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MIKE BAKER: Greetings, everyone.

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Welcome to Google TV or How I Learned to Stop Worrying

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and Exploit Secure Boot.

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My name is Mike Baker.

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I am a firmware developer and I did OpenWrt.

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(Applause.)    MIKE BAKER: We also have Hans Nielsen who

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is a senior securities consultant at Matasano and we have CJ Heres,

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IT systems administrator and we have Tom Dwanger

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in the audience and stand up, Tom.

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(Applause.)    MIKE BAKER: And we have Amir Elemadieh who

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is a researcher at Accuvant LABS and also the founder

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of the GTVHacker group.

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GTVHacker is a group of about six hackers that hack

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in to the Google TV line of products.

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Our primary goal is to bypass the hardware and software restrictions

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and open up the device.

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The GTVHacker team was the first to exploit the Google TV

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and won a $500 bounty.

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So what is the Google TV platform?

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The Google TV platform is an Android device that connects

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to your TV.

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So your TV essentially becomes the same Android device

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as your mobile phone.

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It has HDI in and HDI out and IR.

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Some of them include Blu Ray players and Sony TV has integrated Google TV

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and has a custom version of Chrome and

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a Flash version that I will talk about later.

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So why do we hack the platform?

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We hack the platform because unlike the Google Nexus

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devices it has a heavy restricted kernel and

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the previous generation, generation 1 is the end of life and the Flash player,

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I will get to that in the next slides.

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So before we start I am going to do a very quick recap

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of the stuff we did last year at DEF CON.

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I am going to speed through it.

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So if you missed something look at last year's slides.

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The Logitech review left a root URT and we also have an exploit

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by Dan Rossenburg who uses dev man and sort of wrote an impactor plug in.

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So the Sony similar situation has a no dev bug and we also wrote

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a custom recovery for it and used K exec to load

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in a new kernel and now we have unsigned kernels.

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The Flash player was blocked by various streaming sites.

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So, for example, you can't watch Hula.

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You get redirected to a site that says sorry, this

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is a Google TV and the fix for that is changing the version string.

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So what happened after we hacked these Google

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TV devices?

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We found this, this is a nice message

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from Logitech that they hid in the Android recovery.

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It is a root 13, that says GTVHacker, congratulations,

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if you are reading this please post.

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Let me know.

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And includes all of our nicknames.

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(Laughter).

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MIKE BAKER: Yes.

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Whoever is at Logitech that wrote that you are awesome.

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This is why we hack devices.

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So the Boxee Box is a similar device and using

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the same SoC.

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In the process of hacking the Google TV we came

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up with an exploit for the Boxee Box that led the way

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to the Boxee plus community and it is still vulnerable.

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So that's awesome.

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So next up is Amir.

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(Applause.)    AMIR ELEMADIEH: Hi everyone.

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I am going to continue the presentation.

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My section regards Gen 2 hardware and one of the first ODY that we are

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going to release for the platform.

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So Gen 2 hardware we have a multitude of devices.

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They increase the amount of devices they had by like a factor of 2.

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And I guess they were going to increase the market share

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but essentially you have the Korean LGU plus the S cube

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and the LG 47, G2 and G3 and the Netgear Prime and GS8 and

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the Hipulse and the Vizio Costar and they have

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a similar hardware design short of the LG 47, G2 and G3.

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It is an ARM dual 1.2 gigahertz processor hubbed the Armada 1500.

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And it does Secure Boot from RAM via RSA verification

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and AS decryption.

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On this slide there is not a whole lot to pull from this.

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This is direct from their marketing stuff for the chip.

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Yes, it is just here to show you kind of how they pride the chip set itself.

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Skip the place order apparently.

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So platform information, the newest version of GTV

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is on Android 3.2.

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No public vulnerabilities that worked up until about a week ago.

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The master key vulnerability and the key signing bugs were big news

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and impactor wrote his amazing tool or SARK wrote his amazing

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tool impactor.

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It is a fat G LPSY setup and does not support native libraries.

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Gen 1 was X86 single core atom and Gen 2

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is 1500 dual core ARM 1.2 gigahertz.

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Adds native libraries and bionic LPSY from what we heard in the rumor miles.

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I am going to go through these next devices pretty

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quickly because it is all public information and I am sure

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you don't really care too much.

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Gigabit Flash, site of the Sony it is has the best remote.

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So if you are going to buy Google TV we recommend

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this one.

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Hard to recommend Sony.

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Larger form factor than some of the other Google TV devices

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and has built in IR blasters which sounds

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like something it would be throughout the whole platform.

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No voice search, a custom launcher and $99 MSRP

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and updates are done through update logic as opposed

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to the standard Android check in system.

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Common in all Vizio devices.

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It was launched with AB running as a root.

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When you pick one up because it is actually updated you can AB in,

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AB root and AB has root privileges.

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So it was patched shortly after and it has a $99 MSRP.

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With ADB root there was also a URT root set up I guess

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for debugging and whatnot.

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And they had debugible set as one.

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ADB root was all you needed for a software root, but if you wanted

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to have some fun connect your UR to adapters that we give you after this.

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You can connect to that pin out that's right up there.

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We will have a select number of USB adapters.

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$129 MSRP and two exploits for it.

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One was real and one was technically oversight, at least in our opinion.

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The oversight was that they went ahead and put the console

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to start up on UR regardless.

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Ro.secure was set.

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If they are in a debug environment they will set it to 0 and if not

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in a debug environment they will set it to ro.secure to 1.

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Then we did the NeoTVPrime root which was

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essentially an exploit that leveraged the update system

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on the Netgear NeoTVPrime.

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The process involves checking of persist radio and if it extracts it

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a test mode with a USB drive and then it just straight executes

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a shell script from that file.

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So you run you get local command execution fairly easily

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with a thumb drive and shell script.

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It is the same generation to hardware.

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Horrible mode.

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But we really like this box because of this next part.

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Q root.

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So we have a lot of fun with this.

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We hadn't done an Android APK that actually leveraged

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one of our exploits up until this point.

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It was neat to put this together and certain members were

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a big portion of this.

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So this was great because we created an app that

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not only exploits by patches your cube

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because our whole fear was releasing an exploit in to the market,

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if someone else takes a look at it they could put it in their own app

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and root all your Google TVs.

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So we set it up so that it can do patches and it can do rooting,

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but essentially how it worked it exploited a helper app.

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The helper application passed unsanitized input

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to the mount command resulting in command execution,

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which triggered the vulnerability from Android PK which showed

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network permissions and added it to the Google play store for fun.

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With that being said it was pulled by Google after six days.

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We rooted around 256 boxes including one

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engineer build which was pretty cool.

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And it took two months for them to actually patch it.

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So, you know, with six days in the market can you imagine

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the type of damage someone could have

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actually done if they were trying to maliciously and not just help people

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unlock their devices.

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Then we got to the ODY that I told you guys about.

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We have been using this bug for awhile to do our investigations

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on like new devices and research on new devices

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to see how things are set up.

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So this is kind of something that's new and dear

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to us because it has worked on the entire platform to date.

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What it is is we call the magic USB.

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We like saying magic because we are

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on the Penn & Teller stage I guess.

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If you recall our past exploits it required four USBs.

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You could narrow down the number to a lot lower but you have to have

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a lot of different images for the USB drive and leveraged

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and improperly mounted ext3 drive that was mounted without no dev.

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So there is pretty similar to that.

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It is NTFS root but it is not and it is not done in recovery but it

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is just as powerful.

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So all Google TVs and some other Android devices are vulnerable.

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What this bug is is actually I will get to that in the next slide.

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The way that this is set up it requires a user to have

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an NTFS removable storage device and requires the devices

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to be mounted no dev when you plug it in so you can run mount and see if it

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is no dev.

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And so it affects more than Android.

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It affects certain kernel configurations.

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So with this particular setup volt mounts partition without no dev

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and low num feature it does support blocked devices.

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Our magic USB the process is that you go, you get the major

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and minor hashes.

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You set up a device on a separate computer

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on an NTFS formatted drive and plug it in to your Google TV

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and you DD directly to that newly created device that's

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on your USB drive and the kernel does its magic.

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Even though the partitions are mounted read only it

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overwrites them just beautifully.

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We write it back as a user and reboot and we are rooted.

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So Sony boxes require an additional step.

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Now I am going to go ahead and introduce Hans Nielsen.

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Oh, yeah.

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(Applause.)    HANS NIELSEN: Hello.

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I am Hans.

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So one thing that we really love to do here at GTVHacker

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is we love taking things apart and soldering wires to things.

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It tickles something deep in our brain that makes us feel

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very good.

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There is a few platforms out there.

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One of them is this TV that's made by LG.

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It is an interesting implementation of the platform.

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They use a different chip than the rest of the Gen 2 Google TVs.

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It has a custom chip called the ARM L9.

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LG also signed pretty much everything in terms of images

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on the Flash file system including the boot splash images.

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So this platform has always kind of alluded us.

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It is in a 47 inch LCD TV and it is very upmarket because it

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is a Google TV.

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This thing is over a thousand dollars and we didn't

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want to spend a thousand dollars on it.

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What are we going to do?

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Well, we like taking things apart and putting them back together.

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One eBay we bought a motherboard and a power supply

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and it turns out that you can get that for not so much.

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We soldered some wires to it.

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So this hardware is based around that LG SoC and

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the storage it uses is it is using an eMMC Flash chip.

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It is similar to an SD card and has a few extra little bits that allow

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for secure storage.

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But essentially what it allows us to do is that we can just solder,

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you know, a very few number of wires to this thing and hook it

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up directly to an SD card reader and with that SD card reader we can

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read and write from the Flash on the device at will.

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No issues here.

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So like most devices will have a NAND chip.

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It is much trickier to write those.

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Not as many common available pieces of hardware to read that for you.

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Everyone has an SD reader.

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So to actually root this thing, we spent awhile digging

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through the file system seeing what is here and how can we pull stuff apart.

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At 0X 100,000 hex we found the partition information that tells us

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where each of the partitions are used in this device are.

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So what we did now was we just went through each

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of the partitions looking for okay, is this one signed.

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Can we do anything with it.

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Is there fun stuff here.

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So one of the more interesting partitions

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as usual is system because that contains the majority

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of the files used to actually run Google TV.

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That's where all the ABKs live and all the LPSY lives.

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So likely said all of the file systems stuff was signed

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pretty much but it turns out that they did not sign the system image.

249
00:17:01,999 --> 00:17:04,876
Once we figured that out it was just a matter

250
00:17:04,876 --> 00:17:07,918
of unpacking the system image, figuring out what

251
00:17:07,918 --> 00:17:11,792
in that system image gets quickly called with the boot loader

252
00:17:11,792 --> 00:17:13,999
and messing with it.

253
00:17:13,999 --> 00:17:16,209
It turns out that the boot partition you can see

254
00:17:16,209 --> 00:17:20,792
on the right side here there is part of the boot scripts.

255
00:17:20,999 --> 00:17:25,709
At the bottom it calls this vender bin anit force script.sh.

256
00:17:28,501 --> 00:17:32,334
So we just replace that file to spawn a shell.

257
00:17:32,751 --> 00:17:35,417
Connect it to the UR.

258
00:17:35,417 --> 00:17:40,083
Again we love soldering wires to things and there we go.

259
00:17:40,501 --> 00:17:41,667
Then we have root.

260
00:17:41,999 --> 00:17:45,334
All in a device that we never actually bought the full thing of.

261
00:17:48,999 --> 00:17:55,667
So another device that we did this to was the Sony NSZ GS7 and 8.

262
00:17:55,667 --> 00:17:59,626
They went with this eMMC Flash interface.

263
00:17:59,876 --> 00:18:03,751
So on this platform neither boot nor system were signed.

264
00:18:03,751 --> 00:18:07,999
So just a matter of rewriting those partitions.

265
00:18:07,999 --> 00:18:11,083
So the first thing that we did was the usual way to do this

266
00:18:11,083 --> 00:18:15,876
at Android you modify the boot properties ro.secure is 0.

267
00:18:15,999 --> 00:18:19,334
Straight up ADD the device and everything will be great,

268
00:18:19,334 --> 00:18:21,083
easy, simple.

269
00:18:22,083 --> 00:18:24,918
But we did that and it didn't work.

270
00:18:24,918 --> 00:18:27,417
So it turns out that the anit scripts were checking

271
00:18:27,417 --> 00:18:30,083
signatures for some stuff.

272
00:18:30,501 --> 00:18:33,999
And it was also making sure that some of these properties weren't set.

273
00:18:33,999 --> 00:18:36,083
So it is like okay, ro.secure must be why.

274
00:18:36,459 --> 00:18:40,626
So we went around looking at how is this signature stuff working.

275
00:18:40,626 --> 00:18:43,083
And they are just not verifying those signatures.

276
00:18:43,250 --> 00:18:47,999
So it was pretty simple to just replace anit and then we were

277
00:18:47,999 --> 00:18:52,209
able to do whatever we wanted and yeah.

278
00:18:53,626 --> 00:18:56,999
This is why you don't allow hardware access to systems because you get

279
00:18:56,999 --> 00:18:59,999
to do things like this and then we win.

280
00:19:00,250 --> 00:19:06,125
Another fun feature that this device had was it had a sata port,

281
00:19:06,125 --> 00:19:11,292
but it did actually have the necessary passer components

282
00:19:11,292 --> 00:19:14,876
on the hardware to support.

283
00:19:14,999 --> 00:19:18,375
So we soldered a sata connector to it.

284
00:19:20,250 --> 00:19:23,209
So far it doesn't appear that the kernel actually supports

285
00:19:23,209 --> 00:19:24,999
these things.

286
00:19:24,999 --> 00:19:26,999
But the hard drive is actually spinning

287
00:19:26,999 --> 00:19:30,375
up and we are pretty sure it is working and we

288
00:19:30,375 --> 00:19:33,334
will talk more about that.

289
00:19:33,334 --> 00:19:35,334
So beyond those two devices is another device that came

290
00:19:35,334 --> 00:19:37,125
up very recently.

291
00:19:37,292 --> 00:19:39,334
Very interesting device.

292
00:19:39,334 --> 00:19:40,334
Very similar.

293
00:19:40,334 --> 00:19:43,375
It is an interesting evolution of the GTV family.

294
00:19:43,751 --> 00:19:45,167
Google Chromecast.

295
00:19:45,999 --> 00:19:48,542
Google announced this device last week.

296
00:19:48,999 --> 00:19:50,918
Last Wednesday even.

297
00:19:50,959 --> 00:19:52,918
35 dollars.

298
00:19:52,918 --> 00:19:55,501
This is an order of magnitude cheaper than pretty much

299
00:19:55,501 --> 00:19:57,999
any current GTV device.

300
00:19:58,375 --> 00:20:01,459
It doesn't have the same in and out for HDMI that

301
00:20:01,459 --> 00:20:03,999
all the other GTV devices.

302
00:20:04,918 --> 00:20:06,999
You plug it in to the TV and power it

303
00:20:06,999 --> 00:20:09,876
from the USB cable and boom, you have something

304
00:20:09,876 --> 00:20:11,999
to share with videos.

305
00:20:11,999 --> 00:20:15,999
It is actually a really awesome device and we think it

306
00:20:15,999 --> 00:20:17,999
is very cool.

307
00:20:18,417 --> 00:20:22,417
In many ways we think it solved some of the issues that GTV had

308
00:20:22,417 --> 00:20:26,626
in the past with kind of expensive niche platform.

309
00:20:26,626 --> 00:20:29,501
It is a really interesting device.

310
00:20:29,501 --> 00:20:33,042
Instead of having two thick clients to deal with content you now have one

311
00:20:33,042 --> 00:20:36,000
thinner device that goes with your thick device,

312
00:20:36,000 --> 00:20:40,501
say your phone or your computer and then you can share content directly

313
00:20:40,501 --> 00:20:41,959
to it.

314
00:20:41,959 --> 00:20:45,876
So one of the interesting things about that is so this is a thin device.

315
00:20:45,876 --> 00:20:47,999
How are you pushing content to this device?

316
00:20:47,999 --> 00:20:52,000
Well, you are not just streaming video from your phone.

317
00:20:52,501 --> 00:20:53,999
That's really slow.

318
00:20:53,999 --> 00:20:54,999
That's hard to do.

319
00:20:54,999 --> 00:20:58,042
So this device is actually reasonably powerful.

320
00:20:58,999 --> 00:21:01,999
So what's in it?

321
00:21:01,999 --> 00:21:05,167
We pulled it apart as soon as we could and it turns

322
00:21:05,167 --> 00:21:09,375
out that it has pretty standard stuff that you kind of see

323
00:21:09,375 --> 00:21:11,999
for an embedded device.

324
00:21:11,999 --> 00:21:12,999
It has RAM.

325
00:21:12,999 --> 00:21:13,999
It has Flash.

326
00:21:14,083 --> 00:21:17,542
It has a WiFi chip and has a CPU.

327
00:21:20,999 --> 00:21:25,999
Now this instantly made us go oh, well, this is cool.

328
00:21:25,999 --> 00:21:29,167
Because the Marvell DE 3800 is what we have been seeing in most

329
00:21:29,167 --> 00:21:31,250
of the Gen 2 TVs.

330
00:21:33,459 --> 00:21:36,709
When we saw that we started getting suspicious.

331
00:21:36,918 --> 00:21:38,876
Why is this device in here?

332
00:21:39,250 --> 00:21:42,792
Maybe this shares similarities to the Google TV platform.

333
00:21:44,751 --> 00:21:48,375
So the first thing that we did is say okay, well, this thing is going

334
00:21:48,375 --> 00:21:50,459
to have a URT in it.

335
00:21:50,876 --> 00:21:53,918
So let's go find that.

336
00:21:53,999 --> 00:21:56,459
So we found the URT and started looking

337
00:21:56,459 --> 00:22:00,999
at the kernel output from this device and turns out that it

338
00:22:00,999 --> 00:22:05,417
is very, very, very similar to a Google TV.

339
00:22:05,626 --> 00:22:10,999
It even says booting GTV kernel when you look at the URT output.

340
00:22:11,417 --> 00:22:15,501
And other things that it has.

341
00:22:15,501 --> 00:22:17,999
It has a USB port on it that you use to power it.

342
00:22:19,375 --> 00:22:21,709
But when you if you plug that in to your computer

343
00:22:21,709 --> 00:22:25,959
with a standard USB data cable you don't actually get anything there.

344
00:22:25,959 --> 00:22:27,999
The device doesn't show up or anything.

345
00:22:27,999 --> 00:22:31,834
That's because it is not actually a USB device.

346
00:22:31,834 --> 00:22:33,667
It runs in USB host mode.

347
00:22:33,999 --> 00:22:37,999
So you are actually using a USB on the go cable, plug other devices

348
00:22:37,999 --> 00:22:40,999
in to the Chromecast directly.

349
00:22:41,459 --> 00:22:46,417
Another very fun feature was it has the boot loader as the DE 3100.

350
00:22:47,999 --> 00:22:52,292
If you look at the source code drop that Google provided for this device it

351
00:22:52,292 --> 00:22:54,751
is the same boot loader.

352
00:22:54,751 --> 00:22:57,167
In fact, almost no references to the 3005.

353
00:23:00,542 --> 00:23:06,626
Very, very similar to previous Google TV platforms.

354
00:23:06,626 --> 00:23:08,959
So, of course, the first thing we do is say okay,

355
00:23:08,959 --> 00:23:12,999
although we have this thing how can we get root on it.

356
00:23:13,542 --> 00:23:17,083
Well, part of that involved how do we actually get

357
00:23:17,083 --> 00:23:22,918
to a point where we can, you know, run a recovery on this device.

358
00:23:22,918 --> 00:23:24,083
It is really restricted.

359
00:23:24,083 --> 00:23:26,459
All we have is this URT and we have this host port

360
00:23:26,459 --> 00:23:27,999
and HDMI.

361
00:23:28,083 --> 00:23:30,083
And one button.

362
00:23:32,667 --> 00:23:35,999
The first thing that do with a button you press it while it

363
00:23:35,999 --> 00:23:38,459
is rebooting and turns out holding this button

364
00:23:38,459 --> 00:23:41,876
down causes fun things in the boot loader.

365
00:23:41,999 --> 00:23:45,083
The boot loader has a special recovery mode where

366
00:23:45,083 --> 00:23:50,667
instead of doing a normal, you know, Android style recovery where it boots

367
00:23:50,667 --> 00:23:55,167
a Linux kernel and then you have a whole recovery system there

368
00:23:55,167 --> 00:23:58,626
and does signature verification.

369
00:23:58,999 --> 00:24:03,083
Instead what it does it is a much lower level recovery.

370
00:24:03,083 --> 00:24:10,417
It runs code INF boot loader, reads directly from a USB stick.

371
00:24:10,999 --> 00:24:17,334
So that host mode USB port turns out to be useful for this recovery mode.

372
00:24:17,834 --> 00:24:19,959
So the boot loader is really simple.

373
00:24:19,959 --> 00:24:22,083
They tried to put not too much stuff in there.

374
00:24:22,083 --> 00:24:25,083
So it is not even like it is a file system in this boot loader.

375
00:24:25,542 --> 00:24:33,125
It reads directly from the from 0X 1000 on that USB key.

376
00:24:37,584 --> 00:24:39,999
And then data.

377
00:24:41,250 --> 00:24:45,167
So now that we discovered okay, well, we can actually try and get it

378
00:24:45,167 --> 00:24:47,999
to load images from here, like how do we figure

379
00:24:47,999 --> 00:24:51,751
out what image format it is loading and it is the it is actually

380
00:24:51,751 --> 00:24:55,417
the same standard Marvell image format that we had seen on a lot

381
00:24:55,417 --> 00:24:57,709
of Google TV devices.

382
00:24:57,918 --> 00:25:02,999
We found an image.

383
00:25:03,626 --> 00:25:05,417
Can we boot stuff?

384
00:25:05,417 --> 00:25:07,250
Do we have signed kernels, other signed images we can try running

385
00:25:07,250 --> 00:25:10,250
on here and see if we can get anything to run.

386
00:25:10,876 --> 00:25:16,792
We spent some time looking at the code and what we found was

387
00:25:16,792 --> 00:25:20,918
a very significant oversight.

388
00:25:21,083 --> 00:25:26,999
It turns out that if you don't verify the result of your signature check your

389
00:25:26,999 --> 00:25:30,834
Secure Boot doesn't work very well.

390
00:25:30,834 --> 00:25:31,834
(Laughter).

391
00:25:31,834 --> 00:25:33,834
HANS NIELSEN: So the original root

392
00:25:33,834 --> 00:25:38,334
for this thing was actually pretty straightforward once you figured

393
00:25:38,334 --> 00:25:42,542
out all of the weird steps to get there, like you had to hold

394
00:25:42,542 --> 00:25:45,959
down the button and had to have USB on the go and

395
00:25:45,959 --> 00:25:49,792
a Flash drive and stuff at the right spot.

396
00:25:50,292 --> 00:25:53,999
You get to the point okay, I can load an image on here.

397
00:25:53,999 --> 00:25:57,626
Why is my image verification not failing?

398
00:25:57,626 --> 00:26:02,876
Well, it is because they don't fail it when you verify the image.

399
00:26:02,999 --> 00:26:06,083
So we manage to actually get root on there.

400
00:26:06,083 --> 00:26:07,584
It is awesome.

401
00:26:07,999 --> 00:26:10,834
Google has already patched this.

402
00:26:10,834 --> 00:26:13,083
They released an update for this yesterday.

403
00:26:13,542 --> 00:26:17,709
So I don't know how readable the source code is.

404
00:26:17,709 --> 00:26:22,250
Essentially that green blob on the right side is the patch

405
00:26:22,250 --> 00:26:27,584
from Google that says if Ret return negative 1.

406
00:26:27,999 --> 00:26:30,250
So they patched that.

407
00:26:30,250 --> 00:26:31,250
A little sad.

408
00:26:31,250 --> 00:26:34,501
But we are looking in to    Excuse me.

409
00:26:34,501 --> 00:26:38,542
So a little tradition at DEF CON first time speakers get

410
00:26:38,542 --> 00:26:41,459
to do a shot on stage.

411
00:26:41,876 --> 00:26:43,999
These guys are all first time.

412
00:26:44,125 --> 00:26:45,709
Have to.

413
00:26:45,792 --> 00:26:48,876
Give a big round of applause for the first time.

414
00:26:57,083 --> 00:26:59,792
(Applause.)    Are they 21?

415
00:26:59,792 --> 00:27:00,792
Yes.

416
00:27:00,792 --> 00:27:02,167
Just one shot, not 21 shots.

417
00:27:02,167 --> 00:27:05,626
We have to be able to finish.

418
00:27:05,626 --> 00:27:08,083
Just keep going.

419
00:27:08,083 --> 00:27:09,667
Cheers.

420
00:27:09,709 --> 00:27:13,083
HANS NIELSEN: And one for everyone in the audience.

421
00:27:15,999 --> 00:27:18,459
(Applause.)    Cheers.

422
00:27:18,459 --> 00:27:19,459
Cheers.

423
00:27:19,459 --> 00:27:20,459
Very good.

424
00:27:21,667 --> 00:27:23,792
All right.

425
00:27:25,834 --> 00:27:28,334
You 21?

426
00:27:33,626 --> 00:27:35,459
All right.

427
00:27:35,459 --> 00:27:36,459
No.

428
00:27:36,459 --> 00:27:37,459
Yes.

429
00:27:37,459 --> 00:27:39,876
HANS NIELSEN: Notice I didn't say the wife.

430
00:27:39,876 --> 00:27:40,876
That is a wife.

431
00:27:40,876 --> 00:27:41,876
Cheers.

432
00:27:41,876 --> 00:27:42,876
Cheers.

433
00:27:42,876 --> 00:27:43,999
First time speakers.

434
00:27:43,999 --> 00:27:48,584
Come on, give a round of applause.

435
00:27:48,999 --> 00:27:50,999
(Applause.)    Now we will see if they can keep going

436
00:27:50,999 --> 00:27:54,501
with the presentation and pick up where they left off.

437
00:27:54,501 --> 00:27:57,083
HANS NIELSEN: I am not that much of a lightweight.

438
00:28:01,375 --> 00:28:02,626
Indeed.

439
00:28:02,626 --> 00:28:03,626
Thank you.

440
00:28:03,999 --> 00:28:06,999
That's actually pretty much it for the Chromecast stuff.

441
00:28:09,083 --> 00:28:10,999
Very convenient.

442
00:28:11,167 --> 00:28:14,501
And now I don't have to worry about speaking with a shot in me.

443
00:28:14,501 --> 00:28:15,501
So CJ.

444
00:28:15,501 --> 00:28:28,584
(Applause.)    CJ HERES: So now my introduction, lovely picture.

445
00:28:28,959 --> 00:28:31,626
We have root through the NTFS trick.

446
00:28:31,626 --> 00:28:33,999
It works great and we can write whatever we want.

447
00:28:33,999 --> 00:28:37,083
But relating to the sata header we want more.

448
00:28:39,083 --> 00:28:45,999
So Secure Boot exploit and I promise you they checked the code.

449
00:28:49,083 --> 00:28:55,999
Armada 1000 the older version of the Armada 1500.

450
00:28:57,959 --> 00:29:00,167
Now very similar chips.

451
00:29:00,167 --> 00:29:02,667
Just the 3100 was a bit faster.

452
00:29:03,083 --> 00:29:05,667
So we believe that this exploit should also work

453
00:29:05,667 --> 00:29:08,584
on pretty much every Android based Armada 1000

454
00:29:08,584 --> 00:29:12,876
because the boot loader was provided by that model.

455
00:29:15,999 --> 00:29:20,999
Left hand side the Sony NSZ GS7, Vizio Costar, Hisense pulse,

456
00:29:20,999 --> 00:29:26,999
the LG plus IPTV and Google's Berlin's development device which is similar

457
00:29:26,999 --> 00:29:31,999
to the Vizio Costar and also devices we believe it should work

458
00:29:31,999 --> 00:29:36,083
on but haven't tested because we don't have them,

459
00:29:36,083 --> 00:29:40,501
error desktop PC, the Hisense XT 780 TV which might be

460
00:29:40,501 --> 00:29:42,999
out at any moment.

461
00:29:46,792 --> 00:29:48,584
Might patch it.

462
00:29:50,709 --> 00:29:55,709
Lenovo S31 which is available in China.

463
00:29:56,999 --> 00:29:59,918
And others, there may be other venders using this

464
00:29:59,918 --> 00:30:02,584
chip that we aren't aware of.

465
00:30:02,584 --> 00:30:06,751
Detailed security overview, starting from the internal secure crypto

466
00:30:06,751 --> 00:30:10,501
subprocessor, the box will power on and then execute

467
00:30:10,501 --> 00:30:15,751
the RAM code that is built in to it and will load stage 2.

468
00:30:15,792 --> 00:30:20,999
Stage 2 exists either on demand, eMMC, or over SPI but when it loads it in it

469
00:30:20,999 --> 00:30:26,167
will first decrypt it with a key that's stored within the CPU.

470
00:30:34,918 --> 00:30:37,417
So if it decrypts and verifies successfully it

471
00:30:37,417 --> 00:30:41,375
will actually have a return code and it will return a 1 or 0 depending

472
00:30:41,375 --> 00:30:44,999
on how it boots and either fail or continue.

473
00:30:44,999 --> 00:30:46,250
(Off microphone).

474
00:30:46,250 --> 00:30:48,250
CJ HERES: Sorry.

475
00:30:48,250 --> 00:30:49,918
I will slow down.

476
00:30:49,999 --> 00:30:50,999
(Laughter).

477
00:30:50,999 --> 00:30:53,834
CJ HERES: I will take a sip.

478
00:30:53,999 --> 00:30:54,999
Hold on.

479
00:30:54,999 --> 00:30:55,999
Another shot.

480
00:30:56,083 --> 00:31:02,751
(Laughter) (Applause.)    CJ HERES: Thanks.

481
00:31:11,209 --> 00:31:15,709
So next up stage 2 will then execute.

482
00:31:15,709 --> 00:31:18,667
So assuming it verifies it starts up.

483
00:31:18,667 --> 00:31:21,584
And then stage 2 will finish the initialization

484
00:31:21,584 --> 00:31:26,751
on eMMC that we could remind you modify to pretty much do whatever we

485
00:31:26,751 --> 00:31:31,250
want and it will then load stage 3 to 0X 680000.

486
00:31:31,292 --> 00:31:34,417
We will admit these addresses are somewhat important.

487
00:31:38,417 --> 00:31:40,792
So that will load in.

488
00:31:40,834 --> 00:31:43,876
And assuming it then decrypts and verifies properly it

489
00:31:43,876 --> 00:31:46,501
will then execute stage 3.

490
00:31:46,501 --> 00:31:47,876
Stage 3 is the boot loader.

491
00:31:47,876 --> 00:31:50,209
It is a highly modified version of U Boot and mostly stripped

492
00:31:50,209 --> 00:31:53,417
out and it is kind of funny but simple.

493
00:31:53,751 --> 00:31:57,792
It also has, you know, support to boot secure images.

494
00:31:57,792 --> 00:32:00,918
It will send the image directly to the Secure Boot processor.

495
00:32:00,999 --> 00:32:02,834
Send it back to make sure it is good.

496
00:32:03,083 --> 00:32:07,209
Upon execution it will load the kernel to 0X 01100800.

497
00:32:09,083 --> 00:32:12,209
Assuming then again it decrypts and verifies and

498
00:32:12,209 --> 00:32:15,209
all good and returns a value that it checks it

499
00:32:15,209 --> 00:32:18,999
will then continue to load the RAM disk to 0X I think it

500
00:32:18,999 --> 00:32:21,584
is about 2 million or so.

501
00:32:23,999 --> 00:32:27,542
It will then execute the kernel and the kernel and

502
00:32:27,542 --> 00:32:31,334
the command lines that are set inside the boot loader

503
00:32:31,334 --> 00:32:35,751
will then set a hash to check the anit script to ensure that

504
00:32:35,751 --> 00:32:39,918
the anit binary has not been tampered with.

505
00:32:42,709 --> 00:32:44,959
Then it will then verify the RSA signatures

506
00:32:44,959 --> 00:32:47,876
on the anit scripts which we know don't work but I am sure

507
00:32:47,876 --> 00:32:50,792
they will probably work within a week.

508
00:32:51,167 --> 00:32:54,417
But back to the URT which keep in mind we are giving away URT

509
00:32:54,417 --> 00:32:56,459
adapters after this.

510
00:32:56,459 --> 00:32:57,709
They are kind of pointy.

511
00:33:01,083 --> 00:33:04,375
We can see they have some dot kernel at 0018000.

512
00:33:06,876 --> 00:33:09,626
So again keep that address in mind.

513
00:33:09,626 --> 00:33:10,626
It is important.

514
00:33:12,250 --> 00:33:14,542
This is a picture of the Android kernel

515
00:33:14,542 --> 00:33:16,959
and model secure image.

516
00:33:16,999 --> 00:33:21,876
Android had the Android magic and then some kernel arguments which

517
00:33:21,876 --> 00:33:25,999
it doesn't use and encrypted gunk below it.

518
00:33:25,999 --> 00:33:28,876
So keep that Android kernel header in mind.

519
00:33:29,501 --> 00:33:32,999
Now if you take a look at Asus boot image dot H you have

520
00:33:32,999 --> 00:33:36,125
an instruct for the kernel itself.

521
00:33:39,292 --> 00:33:41,501
Then you have the kernel size.

522
00:33:41,501 --> 00:33:45,375
Kernel address and RAM disk size and RAM disk address and SHA 1 hash

523
00:33:45,375 --> 00:33:49,584
and some of the stuff is not really relevant now.

524
00:33:49,751 --> 00:33:50,999
I am going to pull up a mocked version

525
00:33:50,999 --> 00:33:54,999
of this and give you a minute to review while I take a sip of this.

526
00:33:56,209 --> 00:33:57,667
Whoo.

527
00:33:58,999 --> 00:34:01,083
So the mocked up version of the Android kernel

528
00:34:01,083 --> 00:34:03,459
and Marvell secure version.

529
00:34:05,459 --> 00:34:08,626
Keep in mind these slides will be (lost audio).

530
00:34:12,459 --> 00:34:15,584
Might wait until Monday when we are back home.

531
00:34:20,501 --> 00:34:24,375
But getting to this, Android magic and then kernel size and then kernel

532
00:34:24,375 --> 00:34:26,083
load address.

533
00:34:26,375 --> 00:34:29,999
After the kernel load address we have the RAM disk size and RAM loader

534
00:34:29,999 --> 00:34:33,334
address and then kernel load arguments which surprisingly are

535
00:34:33,334 --> 00:34:35,292
replaced on root.

536
00:34:35,334 --> 00:34:38,999
When we initially started trying to get in to this box we dumped the image

537
00:34:38,999 --> 00:34:40,999
and noticed the Android kernel header

538
00:34:40,999 --> 00:34:44,209
and we figured we could mess around with the command lines

539
00:34:44,209 --> 00:34:46,209
and it might work.

540
00:34:46,999 --> 00:34:50,375
So we went with the eMMC Flash.

541
00:34:51,417 --> 00:34:53,999
We were able to replace the kernel arguments

542
00:34:53,999 --> 00:34:56,542
but it still wasn't changing.

543
00:34:56,876 --> 00:35:02,999
So figured they were replaced and then SSH 1 hash and still boot.

544
00:35:02,999 --> 00:35:05,083
It does not check that.

545
00:35:05,083 --> 00:35:11,459
The actual Marvell secure image which includes a key index and then RSA 1024

546
00:35:11,459 --> 00:35:15,167
bit signature followed by AES.

547
00:35:16,209 --> 00:35:18,417
So not messing around.

548
00:35:18,584 --> 00:35:20,751
But let's take a second look about header.

549
00:35:21,083 --> 00:35:23,709
RAM disk size and RAM disk load address.

550
00:35:23,999 --> 00:35:27,501
In the red is the RAM disk size and in the black is the RAM disk address.

551
00:35:27,999 --> 00:35:31,918
For some idiotic reason they do especially

552
00:35:31,918 --> 00:35:37,459
if we place it where the kernel should be loading.

553
00:35:37,542 --> 00:35:39,751
This loads in right after the kernel.

554
00:35:39,792 --> 00:35:42,501
And since we changed the RAM disk load address we can then

555
00:35:42,501 --> 00:35:45,167
replace the RAM disk with our own unsigned kernel

556
00:35:45,167 --> 00:35:47,999
with sata support or whatever we want and jam it

557
00:35:47,999 --> 00:35:51,250
in there and when we boot the box it will automatically boot

558
00:35:51,250 --> 00:35:52,999
up to that.

559
00:35:54,751 --> 00:35:58,999
So some pseudo code of what the boot loader code looks like.

560
00:35:58,999 --> 00:36:01,626
We have a fixed kernel load address and does

561
00:36:01,626 --> 00:36:06,250
an eMMC read and then does a we thought this was load image

562
00:36:06,250 --> 00:36:10,083
and turns out it is a verify image.

563
00:36:10,083 --> 00:36:12,375
Verify image on the kernel image itself and has

564
00:36:12,375 --> 00:36:15,417
an if to check the return code.

565
00:36:17,250 --> 00:36:20,999
But if you notice after the return it will then load the RAM disk it

566
00:36:20,999 --> 00:36:24,792
will check the RAM disk header size to see what it is and if it is set

567
00:36:24,792 --> 00:36:27,999
to something and it will then load an arbitrary amount of data

568
00:36:27,999 --> 00:36:30,959
at whatever address we will give.

569
00:36:36,083 --> 00:36:37,999
For the Sony NSZ7.

570
00:36:38,751 --> 00:36:40,959
Sony went above and beyond with the security

571
00:36:40,959 --> 00:36:43,584
and also signed the RAM disk image.

572
00:36:44,083 --> 00:36:47,501
However what we could do is append a at a small kernel

573
00:36:47,501 --> 00:36:49,999
and append it with our RAM disk which was

574
00:36:49,999 --> 00:36:53,792
a custom kernel and stick that in to the RAM disk location

575
00:36:53,792 --> 00:36:56,999
and offset the RAM disk load address.

576
00:36:56,999 --> 00:37:02,167
Instead of 010008000 we could set it to 010098000 to something

577
00:37:02,167 --> 00:37:10,292
and then still get hacked kernel to load right address and still execute.

578
00:37:10,375 --> 00:37:12,999
Sony has made quite a few blunders like this trying

579
00:37:12,999 --> 00:37:15,083
to improve security.

580
00:37:15,542 --> 00:37:16,959
I don't know what's up.

581
00:37:17,834 --> 00:37:20,626
So placeholder image and now U Boot.

582
00:37:20,626 --> 00:37:22,959
Through this exploit which we are releasing these packages

583
00:37:22,959 --> 00:37:25,876
for most Google TVs, or you could modify the source code

584
00:37:25,876 --> 00:37:27,999
to whatever you want.

585
00:37:32,959 --> 00:37:36,918
The cubed GPL release had a version of U Boot that we were able

586
00:37:36,918 --> 00:37:39,999
to modify and then get it to execute with no issues

587
00:37:39,999 --> 00:37:43,167
and we could load a kernel via FTP.

588
00:37:44,584 --> 00:37:51,125
I will skip this feature and show you guys a quick demo.

589
00:37:56,167 --> 00:37:57,999
I don't use Max.

590
00:37:57,999 --> 00:37:59,751
Where is my mouse?

591
00:38:00,999 --> 00:38:02,292
Thank you.

592
00:38:02,542 --> 00:38:06,125
So we are also going to show a quick come on.

593
00:38:06,959 --> 00:38:10,999
I look totally computer illiterate.

594
00:38:10,999 --> 00:38:11,999
Seriously.

595
00:38:12,250 --> 00:38:13,667
Fix me.

596
00:38:13,959 --> 00:38:14,959
(Laughter).

597
00:38:14,959 --> 00:38:24,667
CJ HERES: Nice.

598
00:38:24,667 --> 00:38:25,667
There you go.

599
00:38:25,667 --> 00:38:28,375
So what we are doing right now    Nothing on the screen.

600
00:38:28,375 --> 00:38:29,375
CJ HERES: Really?

601
00:38:29,375 --> 00:38:30,375
Do this.

602
00:38:31,083 --> 00:38:33,626
This is your computer and not mine.

603
00:38:33,999 --> 00:38:35,876
Thanks for that.

604
00:38:35,999 --> 00:38:38,999
CJ HERES: This blame is totally not on me.

605
00:38:38,999 --> 00:38:41,999
I am blaming you, too.

606
00:38:41,999 --> 00:38:43,999
That's awesome.

607
00:38:43,999 --> 00:38:49,417
CJ HERES: There you go.

608
00:38:49,417 --> 00:38:52,918
Move to your right.

609
00:38:52,918 --> 00:38:53,918
Move to your right.

610
00:38:53,918 --> 00:38:54,918
Yay.

611
00:38:54,918 --> 00:38:56,459
(Applause.)    CJ HERES: Sweet.

612
00:38:56,459 --> 00:38:57,999
So you are probably not going to be able to make this out and going

613
00:38:57,999 --> 00:39:01,083
to be on Youtube when we are off the stage.

614
00:39:01,999 --> 00:39:06,542
What we are doing right now is we are pulling up Asus cubed

615
00:39:06,542 --> 00:39:09,083
and do an NTFS point.

616
00:39:14,334 --> 00:39:17,125
Then we stuck it inside the Asus cube and what we are

617
00:39:17,125 --> 00:39:19,334
going to do right now is run Flash erase

618
00:39:19,334 --> 00:39:23,167
on the normal one that doesn't work since we don't have root permissions

619
00:39:23,167 --> 00:39:27,709
and then run Flash erase and then write on our modified version.

620
00:39:29,959 --> 00:39:32,626
Keep in mind our custom recovery is rather thin.

621
00:39:32,709 --> 00:39:36,709
It is not like we can just put CWM to it and call it a day

622
00:39:36,709 --> 00:39:40,083
because CWM's buffer uses Android's.

623
00:39:42,792 --> 00:39:45,959
Google TV boxes have a very specific custom version which

624
00:39:45,959 --> 00:39:47,501
is idiotic.

625
00:39:48,584 --> 00:39:51,334
Right now it is showing it being written

626
00:39:51,334 --> 00:39:53,667
and erased and we will give that

627
00:39:53,667 --> 00:39:58,709
a moment and watch blurry text while we listen to a whole model keyboard

628
00:39:58,709 --> 00:40:00,792
to rattle away.

629
00:40:02,999 --> 00:40:04,667
So that was the erase and now we are going

630
00:40:04,667 --> 00:40:07,125
to do the man write and I have a typo.

631
00:40:07,125 --> 00:40:08,834
So it is going to error at first.

632
00:40:12,834 --> 00:40:13,999
Yeah.

633
00:40:13,999 --> 00:40:15,375
This took many, many takes because I do not know how

634
00:40:15,375 --> 00:40:17,083
to use a camera.

635
00:40:23,334 --> 00:40:25,125
So it shows the permission denied trying

636
00:40:25,125 --> 00:40:28,709
to write the actual MTV device and then show my typo.

637
00:40:31,000 --> 00:40:35,000
And honestly I do not know what I mistyped but something happened.

638
00:40:37,417 --> 00:40:38,999
So now we are going to do the actual write

639
00:40:38,999 --> 00:40:41,626
of the custom recovery that we created.

640
00:40:48,209 --> 00:40:50,792
This is the slow of the video watching everything type

641
00:40:50,792 --> 00:40:52,709
and then it picks up.

642
00:40:57,167 --> 00:41:00,959
Write, write, write, write showing that we can write

643
00:41:00,959 --> 00:41:04,167
to anything on the box that we want which should

644
00:41:04,167 --> 00:41:08,083
work on many, many devices and NTFS device can use block

645
00:41:08,083 --> 00:41:10,626
in character devices.

646
00:41:10,876 --> 00:41:13,709
Now we are rebooting in to our custom recovery.

647
00:41:14,375 --> 00:41:19,083
Keep in mind that recovery images, kernel images signed and encrypted

648
00:41:19,083 --> 00:41:22,459
and show you on the left hand side we have put my

649
00:41:22,459 --> 00:41:25,626
handle for the kernel compiler.

650
00:41:25,626 --> 00:41:27,834
We are putting in a USB drive with a copy of U Boot

651
00:41:27,834 --> 00:41:32,501
on it that we are going to then Flash to replace the boot loader.

652
00:41:32,959 --> 00:41:37,125
So there is that custom recovery on the right using unsigned code.

653
00:41:42,250 --> 00:41:44,959
(Applause.)    CJ HERES: And now scrolling all the way

654
00:41:44,959 --> 00:41:47,417
to the top we did a busy box I.D.

655
00:41:47,999 --> 00:41:51,959
Also roots over ADB and if you want you can modify

656
00:41:51,959 --> 00:41:54,999
to whatever else you want.

657
00:41:55,250 --> 00:41:59,083
Command line, just proving that it is our own custom compiled kernel

658
00:41:59,083 --> 00:42:03,959
running on the box and pressing 1 and installing the custom U Boot.

659
00:42:06,542 --> 00:42:09,083
As completed we are going to be set.

660
00:42:09,375 --> 00:42:11,209
Reboot the box and you will see on the left hand side we will go

661
00:42:11,209 --> 00:42:14,083
to U Boot prompt letting us boot anything we want.

662
00:42:14,709 --> 00:42:16,999
We can start whatever we need.

663
00:42:17,417 --> 00:42:19,999
So pretty much it for the demo video.

664
00:42:19,999 --> 00:42:22,292
I am going to shoot it back to MBM to close up.

665
00:42:29,999 --> 00:42:31,999
(Applause.)    Good luck.

666
00:42:31,999 --> 00:42:33,459
(Applause.)    MIKE BAKER: So links to everything that we have covered

667
00:42:33,459 --> 00:42:36,083
in this presentation is at DC21.gtvhacker.com.

668
00:42:38,584 --> 00:42:40,999
We thank you all for attending and we are going to hand

669
00:42:40,999 --> 00:42:42,999
out some URT adapters.

670
00:42:42,999 --> 00:42:45,292
We are looking for questions that people who ask

671
00:42:45,292 --> 00:42:49,501
questions will get priority and URT adapters and after that we

672
00:42:49,501 --> 00:42:52,167
will hand out what's left.

673
00:42:52,792 --> 00:42:54,292
Quick questions.

674
00:42:54,292 --> 00:42:55,292
Anyone?

675
00:42:55,292 --> 00:42:56,999
Right here.

676
00:43:00,083 --> 00:43:02,167
(Off microphone).

677
00:43:05,375 --> 00:43:09,918
He said what experience do we have getting Android applications that are

678
00:43:09,918 --> 00:43:12,918
not built for the Google TV with native code to run

679
00:43:12,918 --> 00:43:14,918
on the Google TV.

680
00:43:14,918 --> 00:43:17,792
I actually did put together a native development kit

681
00:43:17,792 --> 00:43:21,459
for Google TV but it is not in a good state that I feel

682
00:43:21,459 --> 00:43:23,999
comfortable releasing.

683
00:43:23,999 --> 00:43:26,375
I built a connect APK with just some

684
00:43:26,375 --> 00:43:31,999
like it does very minimal like it uses very minimal native code

685
00:43:31,999 --> 00:43:33,999
but it works.

686
00:43:33,999 --> 00:43:36,125
I tested the native code and it works fine.

687
00:43:36,125 --> 00:43:38,667
If anyone in the community wants to step forward and help

688
00:43:38,667 --> 00:43:41,792
out with that we would appreciate it.

689
00:43:41,792 --> 00:43:45,209
If you want to come and grab your adapter.

690
00:43:45,751 --> 00:43:46,751
Anyone else?

691
00:43:48,125 --> 00:43:49,999
Right here.

692
00:43:51,375 --> 00:43:54,083
It is very pointy.

693
00:43:54,083 --> 00:43:57,083
Can you say that again?

694
00:43:57,083 --> 00:43:58,876
(Off microphone).

695
00:43:58,876 --> 00:44:00,709
He asked if we tried JTAG debugging or

696
00:44:00,709 --> 00:44:02,999
if URT is sufficient.

697
00:44:02,999 --> 00:44:05,959
URT has been sufficient up until this point.

698
00:44:07,334 --> 00:44:09,751
We haven't made a whole lot of progress with them and

699
00:44:09,751 --> 00:44:11,417
the Gen 1 we did.

700
00:44:12,542 --> 00:44:15,375
We haven't needed it at this point.

701
00:44:15,375 --> 00:44:19,959
If we got down to it we would go to that route, but we haven't yet.

702
00:44:19,999 --> 00:44:21,999
You want to give him one.

703
00:44:22,125 --> 00:44:23,125
Anyone?

704
00:44:23,125 --> 00:44:24,125
Next question.

705
00:44:24,125 --> 00:44:25,125
Right here.

706
00:44:25,125 --> 00:44:27,626
(Off microphone).

707
00:44:27,999 --> 00:44:29,751
He asked besides Hula what other content

708
00:44:29,751 --> 00:44:32,542
providers have we had issues with?

709
00:44:32,876 --> 00:44:40,709
CBS, Fox, miscellaneous Flash streaming sites.

710
00:44:40,709 --> 00:44:43,709
It is ridiculous the number of people that choose to block us

711
00:44:43,709 --> 00:44:46,375
or block Google TV in general.

712
00:44:47,751 --> 00:44:49,834
(Off microphone).

713
00:44:51,083 --> 00:44:54,167
He asked how many have we had success bypassing?

714
00:44:54,751 --> 00:44:55,751
All of them.

715
00:44:55,751 --> 00:44:58,250
We mimic the desktop Flash setup.

716
00:44:58,417 --> 00:44:59,999
If you want to give him one.

717
00:45:00,876 --> 00:45:05,334
I think we are I think we are running low on time.

718
00:45:05,334 --> 00:45:07,999
So let me get like one or two more questions.

719
00:45:07,999 --> 00:45:08,999
Yes.

720
00:45:08,999 --> 00:45:09,999
Okay.

721
00:45:09,999 --> 00:45:11,792
Like guy in the red shirt and then we will get the guy

722
00:45:11,792 --> 00:45:14,501
in the black shirt that's behind him.

723
00:45:14,501 --> 00:45:15,999
(Off microphone).

724
00:45:19,250 --> 00:45:21,375
Can you repeat the question?

725
00:45:21,375 --> 00:45:22,375
I am sorry.

726
00:45:27,709 --> 00:45:29,751
(Off microphone).

727
00:45:29,751 --> 00:45:32,542
It hasn't been something he asked if we have tried to get a Python

728
00:45:32,542 --> 00:45:36,083
or pro or any other scripting languages on the box.

729
00:45:36,375 --> 00:45:41,125
We haven't worked on that, but it would absolutely be possible.

730
00:45:41,375 --> 00:45:42,375
Yes.

731
00:45:42,626 --> 00:45:45,292
It is Linux at its core.

732
00:45:45,292 --> 00:45:47,083
So let me get this.

733
00:45:47,209 --> 00:45:49,542
I am sorry.

734
00:45:49,667 --> 00:45:52,083
And oh, wow.

735
00:45:52,083 --> 00:45:53,083
Good throw.

736
00:45:53,083 --> 00:45:54,083
Black shirt polo.

737
00:45:54,334 --> 00:45:57,209
(Off microphone).

738
00:45:57,626 --> 00:46:00,083
He asked what's next for the Chromecast.

739
00:46:00,083 --> 00:46:03,125
We are looking at other avenues of exploitation but we are afraid

740
00:46:03,125 --> 00:46:05,334
to mention exactly what they are based

741
00:46:05,334 --> 00:46:09,584
on how quickly it was patched and also that we are here.

742
00:46:09,584 --> 00:46:14,542
If we say anything publicly it could bite us in the butt.

743
00:46:14,542 --> 00:46:16,250
So if you want to someone want to give that gentleman one

744
00:46:16,250 --> 00:46:18,125
or throw one at him.

745
00:46:18,125 --> 00:46:19,125
Sorry.

746
00:46:19,334 --> 00:46:20,999
Oh, my God.

747
00:46:20,999 --> 00:46:21,999
Okay.

748
00:46:22,250 --> 00:46:24,542
You know, let's use the honor system and pass that

749
00:46:24,542 --> 00:46:28,584
to him if that's cool or, you know, just leave it for Penn & Teller.

750
00:46:28,999 --> 00:46:29,999
I think the gentleman in the black shirt had

751
00:46:29,999 --> 00:46:32,709
a question unless it was already answered.

752
00:46:32,918 --> 00:46:35,250
(Off microphone).

753
00:46:35,459 --> 00:46:38,209
No, we would actually really love to know.

754
00:46:38,209 --> 00:46:41,584
If anyone is here from Google is here we would love to talk to them.

755
00:46:41,999 --> 00:46:45,999
We had an open conversation with Google and we don't know

756
00:46:45,999 --> 00:46:49,959
if they hate us and we get the feeling that they do

757
00:46:49,959 --> 00:46:53,876
because they tend to shy away from us.

758
00:46:58,375 --> 00:47:03,209
Let's give him a URT and we will continue this in the Q and A room.

759
00:47:05,125 --> 00:47:06,417
Oh.

760
00:47:06,417 --> 00:47:08,125
This is this is getting bad.

761
00:47:08,626 --> 00:47:10,959
So we will follow up in the Q and A room.

762
00:47:10,959 --> 00:47:12,417
We can hand these out directly.

763
00:47:16,751 --> 00:47:19,209
We don't have any more time for questions but we will have time

764
00:47:19,209 --> 00:47:20,999
in the other room.

765
00:47:22,709 --> 00:47:26,083
We will have time in the other room if any of you guys want to follow up.

766
00:47:26,083 --> 00:47:27,083
Thank you.

767
00:47:27,083 --> 00:47:28,626
(Applause)    You did great.

768
00:47:28,626 --> 00:47:29,626
Thank you.

769
00:47:29,626 --> 00:47:31,125
We didn't hurt anyone, did we?