Setiri: Advances in Trojan Technology

Roelof Temmingh & Haroon Meer Defcon 10

> Las Vegas 2002

orground atherin

Schedule

Introduction

Why Trojans?

Brief History of Trojans & Covert Channels

The Hybrid model Setiri: Advances in Trojan Technology

Demonstration

Taking it further

Possible fixes

Introduction

SensePost

The speakers

Objective of the presentation

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Why Trojans?

Profile of Trojan users

Real criminals... ...don't write buffer overflows

The weirdness of the industry

Examples



Brief History of Trojans & Covert Tunnels

Trojans

From Quick Thinking Greeks ...


to Quick Thinking Geeks

Tunnels

Covert Channels


underground curity gathering

Trojans (Valid IP – No Filters)




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Trojans (Valid IP – Stateless Filter)



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the plane

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Brief History of Trojans & Covert Tunnels

Trojans

From Quick Thinking Greeks ...

to Quick Thinking Geeks

Tunnels

Covert Channels

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Tunnels & Covert Channels

1985 – TSC Definition"Covert Channels"

1996 – Phrack Magazine – LOKI

1998 – RWWWShell – THC

1999 - HTTPTUNNEL – GNU

2000 - FireThru - Firethru

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Conventional Trojans & how they fail

Stateful firewall & IDS

Direct model

Direct model with network tricks

ICMP tunneling

ACK tunneling

Properly configured stateful firewall

IRC agents +

Authentication proxy

HTTP tunnel ++

Personal firewall & Advanced Proxy

HTTP tunnel with Authentication +++

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Hybrid model: "GatSlag"

Combination between covert

Tunnel and Trojan

Defenses mechanisms today:

Packet filters (stateful) / NAT

Authentication Proxies


Intrusion detection systems

Personal firewalls

Content/protocol checking

Biometrics/Token Pads/One time passwords

Encryption



How GatSlag worked

Reverse connection

HTTP covert tunnel

Microsoft Internet Explorer as transport

Controls IE via OLE

Encapsulate in IE, not HTTP

Receive commands in title of web page

Receive encoded data as plain text in body of web page

Send data with POST request

Send alive signals with GET request

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Why GatSlag worked

Integration of client with MS Proxy

NTLM authentication

SSL capable

Registry changes

Personal firewalls

Just another browser

Platform independent

IE on every desktop

Specify Controller

Via public web page - the MASTER site

Problems with Gatslag

The Controller's IP can be obtained !

Handling of multiple instances

GUI support

Controller needed to be online

Batch commands Command history Multiple controllers Upload facility not efficient Platform support

Stability

Session level tunneling

Setiri: Advances in Trojan Technology

Design notes:

Web site contains instructions

CGIs to create new instruction

Controller's interface:

-EXEC (DOS commands, various)

-TX (File upload)

-RX (File download)

Directory structure – each instance

Trojan "surfs" to web site - just a normal user would

Setiri: Advances in Trojan Technology II

Anonymity

Problems with normal proxies

Already using a proxy

Proxy logs

"Cleaners" provide anonymity

"In browser proxy" – Anonymizer

Trojan -> Cleaner: SSL

Cleaner -> Controller: SSL

Challenges: Browser history Temporary files

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Why defenses fail

Firewalls (stateful/NAT)


Configured to allow user or proxy out

Content level & IDS Looks like valid HTTP requests & replies Files downloaded as text in web pages No data or ports to lock on to SSL provides encryption

Personal firewalls

IE valid application Configured to allow browsing

Authentication proxies User surf the web est underground security gathering



Solving the dilemma

Delivery

White listing

User education

AV, personal firewalls

Should you allow everyone to surf the 'net?

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Conclusion

