BSD Security Fundamentals

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Scope and Scale

- Focus: FreeBSD enterprise hardware support and most 'mainstream' of the open source BSD trees.
- Security refresher and some new and interesting BSD security information.
- Emphasis on host-based security, one of the first layers of the security 'onion' complimented with network-level security [defense in-depth].

BSD – making inroads in the Enterprise market

- BSD and systems w/ BSD frameworks being deployed in the enterprise and with the end user.
- Nokia firewalls run FireWall-1 on IPSO [based on FreeBSD 3.2]
- Juniper's Internet backbone router products, designed for high-growth, high-capacity networks, use code from FreeBSD.
- Other commercial BSD implementors include Yahoo! and LinkExchange

The Basics

- If modifying an existing system, especially in a production environment, make backups!
- Unnecessary services go through /etc/inetd.conf and rc.conf; disable what you don't need [inetd.conf now shipped with everything off by default] [rc.conf - disable sendmail, SMTP and submission ports 25/587]
- Work with the latest version of the OS tracking STABLE is the best idea

Encrypted Communications

- Disable telnet (default in recent FreeBSD releases) and enable SSH. OpenSSH is included in the FreeBSD base system.
- Upgrade all your systems to OpenSSH 3.4p1 and use SSH version 2 with privilege separation.
- Enable the sftp subsystem built into the SSHv2 protocol rather than a standard ftpd implementation if possible.
- Set up public key authentication with SSH [DSA keys!] to prevent password transmission, encrypted or otherwise!

File System Lockdown

- Partition out as much as possible; /, /usr, /var, /tmp at a minimum. /home and /usr/local should be considered as well.
- Mount non /usr or / [for /sbin] filesystems with the 'nosuid' argument, especially /tmp.
- Search for and remove suid bits off of nonused binaries [especially uucp - setgid]
- Use the chflags to set variables such as sappnd on log files, schg on system binaries, etc.
- [Explain different securelevel aware file variables here - sappnd, schg]

Kernel Securelevels

- Kernel securelevels allow variable security level increases on the fly.
- Levels range from -1 -> 3, -1 and 0 are referred to as 'insecure mode'.
- Securelevels can only be raised, not lowered, once the system is in multiuser mode.



Kernel Securelevels [cont.]

- Securelevel 1 sappnd and schg flags can not be disabled - LKMs may not be loaded or unloaded.
- Securelevel 2 Securelevel 1 + no writing to disks except for mount(2). Time changes clamped to +/- 1 second.
- Securelevel 3 Securelevel 2 + IPFW rules cannot be modified.
- Schg flag on files in /, /bin, /usr/bin, /sbin, /usr/sbin/ for maximum effectiveness.

Sysctl and rc.conf variables

- [sysctl] net.inet.tcp.blackhole=2 and net.inet.udp.blackhole=1 don't generate RSTs on connection attempts to ports with no socket listening [TCP] and doesn't generate an ICMP port unreachable message on a port with no socket listening [UDP]. This breaks traceroute.
- [rc.conf] kern_securelevel_enable="YES", kern_securelevel="X"
 enable kernel securelevel
- [rc.conf] icmp_drop_redirect="YES" drop ICMP redirect packets. you don't want these.
- [rc.conf] tcp_drop_synfin="YES" drop packets with SYN+FIN bits set. breaks RFC, do it anyway! SYN+FIN scans are frequent.
- [rc.conf] clear_tmp_enable="YES" wipe /tmp on boot.

Secure your services

- Start potentially dangerous programs such as bind in a chroot'd environment. Many popular services now support chroot() jail functionality. [named, sshd, httpd]
- log_in_vain="YES" in rc.conf show connections to non-listening tcp/udp ports goes well with robust packet filtering ruleset.
- Use packet filtering software such as IPFW or ipfilter to restrict access to services, even if the machine sits behind a corporate firewall [defense in depth!]

Serving files with ftpd

- FreeBSD powers large FTP software sites like ftp.cdrom.com - securely!
- Put individual users in the /etc/ftpchroot file to restrict them to their \$HOME.
- Start ftpd with -I -I to enable extended logging.
- If running an anonymous archive, use ftpd -A [only allow anonymous connections] and -r [read-only mode for the server]

Logging

- Start syslogd with the '-ss' flags to prevent the daemon from opening 514/udp.
- Centralize syslog to a central server in addition to local logging: *.*
 @remotehost.org
- Add /var/log/ftpd for for ftp.*
- Add /var/log/security for security.* [IPFW logs on security facility; allows for parsing of ipfw logs via 'ipfw add deny log..' command.

Nifty kernel tricks

- www.trojanproof.org trojan detection kernel patch [OpenBSD/FreeBSD] - alerts based on md5 variations on files executed on your system; works well with Tripwire/AIDE.
- cerber.sf.net real time interception and logging of potentially dangerous system calls; execve(), ptrace(), setuid(), etc. all configurable via sysctl commands. excellent logging. [think entercept functionality for BSD]
- Disable BPF in your kernel uncomment 'pseudo-device bpf [n]' in your kernel. This prevents an attacker from sniffing traffic coming off your connection.

Keeping people out

- Use TCP wrappers [/etc/hosts.allow] to allow / deny access to certain TCP services. FTP / SSH / other potentially non 'public' services [not as useful = HTTP and SMTP].
- Use AllowUsers / AllowGroups SSH configuration options to restrict SSH usage to certain users and groups. This works well along with TCP wrapper usage and privilege separation.
- Give users who only require ftp access the /sbin/nologin shell to prevent access to a 'real' shell.

Checking your system

- /usr/ports/security/nmap port scan yourself to check for strange services.
- /usr/ports/security/whisker audit your web server for potential vulnerabilities
- /usr/ports/security/tripwire-1.31 academic source release of tripwire, file integrity assurance.
- /usr/ports/security/snort lightweight NIDS implementation, http://www.snort.org.

Other tips and tricks

- Use ntpdate to synch your clock with a time server [e.g. ntp.nasa.gov]. Crontab it routinely to keep it reliable.
- In /etc/ttys change the 'secure' flag to 'insecure' on each local TTY to prevent direct root login; login should always be done through a user account and then 'su' to root.
- Enable sudo for restricting the root password on your system; grant certain users root privileges for certain commands.
- Enable 'pseudo-device snp 4' and use the 'watch' command to non-interactively attach yourself to a user's tty. Nifty :)

Links to related material

- This presentation: http://www.subterrain.net/presentations/
- FreeBSD security advisories and info: http://www.freebsd.org/security/
- Free FreeBSD stuff courtesy of: FREEBSDMALL.COM. Thanks Murray!